Competition Rules for the Digital Age: The Economics of Personalized Data, Consumer Protection and the 9th Amendment of German Competition Law

被引：0
作者：
Budzinski O. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Fachgebiet Wirtschaftstheorie, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Institut für Medien und Mobilkommunikation, Technische Universität Ilmenau, Ilmenau
来源：
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik | 2017年 / 43卷 / 3期
关键词：
Algorithmic collusion; Antitrust; Behavioral discrimination; Big data; Competition economics; Competition policy; Consumer protection; Digital personal assistants; Digitalization; Economics of privacy; Facebook; Industry 4.0; Internet economics;
D O I：
10.1007/s41025-017-0082-6
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The digitization of economic relations creates considerable challenges for competition policy. Against this background, the recent 9 th amendment of the German Law against Restrictions of Competition explicitly targets to make competition rules fit for the digital age. This article provides an overview on the relevant changes in German competition law. It discusses the changes that relate to the digitization of the economy against the background of the state-of-the-art of economic theory. According to the analysis, the 9 th amendment improves German competition policy in a couple of areas, in particular in relation to data-based online markets and to powerful digital platforms. However, in other areas, the changes are unlikely to meet the target, for instance with respect to data-based price discrimination, other types of behavioral discrimination, or regarding enhanced protection of anticompetitive publisher cooperation from competition law. Eventually, the article sketches three areas where expectably the next challenges from digitization to competition policy will surface. © 2017, List-Gesellschaft e.V.
引用
收藏
页码：221 / 249
页数：28
相关论文
共 66 条
[1]  
Acquisti A., Varian H.R., Conditioning prices on purchase history, Marketing Science, 24, 3, pp. 367-381, (2005)
[2]  
Acquisti A., Taylor C.R., Wagman L., The economics of privacy, Journal of Economic Literature, 54, 2, pp. 442-492, (2016)
[3]  
Affeldt P., Filistrucchi L., Klein T.J., Upward pricing pressure in two-sided markets, Economic Journal, 123, pp. F505-F523, (2013)
[4]  
Anderson S.P., Gabszewicz J., The media and advertising: a tale of two-sided markets, Economics of Art and Culture, 1, pp. 567-614, (2006)
[5]  
Anderson S.P., de Palma A., Competition for attention in the information (overload) age, RAND Journal of Economics, 43, 1, pp. 1-25, (2012)
[6]  
Armstrong M., Competition in two-sided markets, Rand Journal of Economics, 37, 3, pp. 668-691, (2006)
[7]  
Beresford A.R., Kubler D., Preibusch S., Unwillingness to pay for privacy: a field experiment, Economics Letters, 117, 1, pp. 25-27, (2012)
[8]  
Brown I., The economics of privacy, data protection and surveillance, Handbook on the economics of the internet, pp. 247-261, (2016)
[9]  
Budzinski O., An economic perspective on the jurisdictional reform of the European merger control system, European Competition Journal, 2, 1, pp. 119-140, (2006)
[10]  
Budzinski O., Wettbewerbsordnung online: Aktuelle Herausforderungen durch Marktplätze im Internet, ORDO, 67, pp. 385-409, (2016)
1234567