Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress

被引：0
作者：
Seungbae Park
机构：
[1] Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology,
来源：
Journal for General Philosophy of Science | 2020年 / 51卷
关键词：
Cognitive episode; Means-end thesis; Non-cognitive episode; Restriction thesis;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (J Gen Philos Sci 49(3):451–459, 2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park in J Gen Philos Sci 48(4):569–579, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos Sci 56(72):82, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.
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页码：173 / 184
页数：11
相关论文
共 14 条
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