Optimal ordering decision and information leakage preference under asymmetric forecast signal

被引:0
|
作者
Min Tang
Li Jiang
Zhiguo Li
Hongwu Zhang
机构
[1] Chongqing University,School of Economics and Business Administration
[2] Chongqing Technology and Business University,School of Business Administration
[3] Chongqing Technology and Business University,School of Management Science and Engineering
来源
Soft Computing | 2021年 / 25卷
关键词
Supply chain management; Forecasting signal; Asymmetric information; Ordering quantity; Signaling game;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This work investigates the retailers’ sourcing decisions with or without information leakage and studies the impact of the forecasting accuracy on supply chain members’ preferences for information leakage. To derive the retailers’ optimal sourcing quantities under two scenarios, one without and one with information leakage, we formulate a supply chain in which a common manufacturer offers a wholesale price contract to two competing retailers, one of whom (the incumbent) has private forecasting information about the market demand and the other one (the entrant) does not. We find that the incumbent with information advantage may have a worse profit and lower market share than the entrant under no information leakage. We show that the incumbent has an incentive to impact the entrant’s sourcing decision by managing her own sourcing quantity reflecting private forecasting information under information leakage. Then, we compare the supply chain members’ performances under different conditions; counterintuitively, the result shows that information leakage may benefit the manufacturer when the prior probability of the booming market is low enough or the forecasting signal is not sufficiently accurate even if the incumbent’s forecasts that the market will be slack; we show that the information leakage will benefit the incumbent when the forecasting information is not sufficiently accurate and the prior probability of the booming market is high enough even if she forecasts that the market will be booming; we find that information leakage will hurt the entrant’s profit when the incumbent forecasts that the market will be slack, or when the market will be booming under the condition of the forecasting information is not sufficiently accurate and the prior probability of the booming market is high enough. Meanwhile, we find that the many-win condition will never occur in our model setting, and the preferences of all three supply chain members for information leakage will never become concert.
引用
收藏
页码:10797 / 10812
页数:15
相关论文
共 48 条
  • [1] Optimal ordering decision and information leakage preference under asymmetric forecast signal
    Tang, Min
    Jiang, Li
    Li, Zhiguo
    Zhang, Hongwu
    SOFT COMPUTING, 2021, 25 (16) : 10797 - 10812
  • [2] Strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information
    Ozer, Ozalp
    Wei, Wei
    MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2006, 52 (08) : 1238 - 1257
  • [3] Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage
    Fang, Debin
    Ren, Qiyu
    SYMMETRY-BASEL, 2019, 11 (03):
  • [4] Manufacturer encroachment with quality decision under asymmetric demand information
    Zhang, Jianxiong
    Li, Sa
    Zhang, Shichen
    Dai, Rui
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2019, 273 (01) : 217 - 236
  • [5] On the interaction between asymmetric demand signal and forecast accuracy information
    Wang, Jiao
    Liu, Zhibing
    Zhao, Ruiqing
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2019, 277 (03) : 857 - 874
  • [6] Behavioral Contract Design Under Asymmetric Forecast Information
    Johnsen, Lennart C.
    Voigt, Guido
    Corbett, Charles J.
    DECISION SCIENCES, 2019, 50 (04) : 786 - 815
  • [7] Optimal reservation pricing strategy for a fashion supply chain with forecast update and asymmetric cost information
    Yang, Danqin
    Xiao, Tiaojun
    Choi, Tsan-Ming
    Cheng, T. C. E.
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH, 2018, 56 (05) : 1960 - 1981
  • [8] Quality evaluation decision in outsourcing under asymmetric information
    Zhang, CH
    Yu, HB
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON QUALITY & RELIABILITY, 2005, : 333 - 338
  • [9] Optimal design of intergovernmental grants under asymmetric information
    Huber, B
    Runkel, M
    INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE, 2006, 13 (01) : 25 - 41
  • [10] Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants Under Asymmetric Information
    Bernd Huber
    Marco Runkel
    International Tax and Public Finance, 2006, 13 : 25 - 41