Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection

被引：1
|
作者：
Meglena Jeleva
Bertrand Villeneuve
机构：
[1] Université de Nantes,LEN
[2] EUREQua,C3E
[3] CEA-IDEI Université de Toulouse 1,undefined
来源：
Economic Theory | 2004年 / 23卷
关键词：
Imprecise probabilities; Insurance markets; Adverse selection.;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered.
引用
收藏
页码：777 / 794
页数：17
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