Higher-Order Intentionality and Higher-Order Acquaintance

被引：0

作者：

Benj Hellie

机构：

[1] University of Toronto,Department of Philosophy

来源：

Philosophical Studies | 2007年 / 134卷

关键词：

Phenomenal Character; Intentional Relation; Real Entity; Singular Proposition; Intentional Property;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

I argue against such “Higher-Order Intentionalist” theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the ground that they understand a subject’s awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than “direct”, like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness takes the relation of awareness to be nonintentional.

引用

页码：289 / 324

页数：35

共 13 条

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