Conditional conservatism and the yield spread of corporate bond issues

被引：21
作者：
Liu M. [1 ]
Magnan M. [2 ]
机构：
[1] I. H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba, 181 Freedman Crescent, Winnipeg, R3T 5V4, MB
[2] John Molson School of Business, Concordia University, 1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W, Montreal, H3G 1M8, QC
来源：
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | 2016年 / 46卷 / 4期
关键词：
Conditional conservatism; Debt contract efficiency; Debt contract renegotiation costs; Information costs; Yield spread;
D O I：
10.1007/s11156-014-0489-6
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Building upon recent research which indicates that debt markets rather than equity markets shape financial reporting, this study examines how conditionally conservative financial reporting relates to the yield spread of corporate bond issues. Our findings suggest that the debt contract efficiency/information costs view of conditional conservatism, documented in private debt contracts, does not generalize to public debt contracts. Instead, a debt contract renegotiation costs perspective seems to better capture the dynamics of the public debt markets, with conditionally conservative reporting being associated with higher yield spread of corporate bond issues. Additional subsample test results indicate that the association between conditional conservatism and bond yield spreads is more pronounced in non-investment grade bonds, for bond issuers with more financial distress, and for bonds that are issued before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This study fills a gap in the conservatism literature, which focuses primarily on equity or private bank loan markets with traditional debt contract efficiency/information costs view. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014.
引用
收藏
页码：847 / 879
页数：32
相关论文
共 79 条
[31]  
Denis D., Mihov V., The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt: Evidence from new corporate borrowings, J Financ Econ, 70, 1, pp. 3-28, (2003)
[32]  
Dennis S., Nandy D., Sharpe I., Determinants of contract terms in bank revolving lines of credit, J Financ Quant Anal, 35, pp. 87-109, (2000)
[33]  
Diamond D., Financial intermediation & delegated monitoring, Rev Econ Stud, 51, 3, pp. 393-414, (1984)
[34]  
Diamond D., Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt, J Polit Econ, 99, 4, pp. 689-721, (1991)
[35]  
Dichev I., Skinner D., Large-sample evidence on the debt covenant hypothesis, J Acc Res, 40, 4, pp. 1091-1123, (2002)
[36]  
Fama E., What’s different about banks?, J Monet Econ, 15, 1, pp. 29-39, (1985)
[37]  
Joint conceptual framework project, financial accounting standards advisory council, Financial Accounting Standards Boards, (2005)
[38]  
Norwalk Francis J., Hanna D., Vincent L., Causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offs, J Acc Res, 34, pp. 117-134, (1996)
[39]  
Francis J., Lafond R., Olsson P.M., Schipper K., Costs of equity and earnings attributes, Acc Rev, 79, 4, pp. 967-1010, (2004)
[40]  
Garcia Lara J.M., Garcia Osma B., Penalva F., Conditional conservatism and cost of capital, Rev Acc Stud, 16, 2, pp. 247-271, (2011)
12345678