Faking photon number on a transition-edge sensor

被引：0
作者：
Poompong Chaiwongkhot
Jiaqiang Zhong
Anqi Huang
Hao Qin
Sheng-cai Shi
Vadim Makarov
机构：
[1] University of Waterloo,Institute for Quantum Computing
[2] University of Waterloo,Department of Physics and Astronomy
[3] Mahidol University,Department of Physics, Faculty of Science
[4] Quantum Technology Foundation (Thailand),Purple Mountain Observatory and Key Laboratory of Radio Astronomy
[5] Chinese Academy of Sciences,Institute for Quantum Information & State Key Laboratory of High Performance Computing, College of Computer Science and Technology
[6] National University of Defense Technology,Centre for Quantum Technologies
[7] National University of Singapore,Shanghai Branch, National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale and CAS Center for Excellence in Quantum Information
[8] Russian Quantum Center,NTI Center for Quantum Communications
[9] University of Science and Technology of China,undefined
[10] National University of Science and Technology MISiS,undefined
来源：
EPJ Quantum Technology | 2022年 / 9卷
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摘要：
We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In one experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending a larger number of photons at a longer wavelength, which is an expected and known behaviour. In another experiment, we unexpectedly find that the detector can be blinded by bright continuous-wave light and then, a controlled response simulating single-photon detection can be produced by applying a bright light pulse. We model an intercept-and-resend attack on a quantum key distribution system that exploits the latter vulnerability and, under certain assumptions, able to steal the key.
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