On the Stability of Generalized Second Price Auctions with Budgets

被引:0
作者
Josep Díaz
Ioannis Giotis
Lefteris Kirousis
Evangelos Markakis
Maria Serna
机构
[1] Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya,Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes Informatics
[2] National and Kapodistrian University of Athens,Department of Mathematics
[3] Computer Technology Institute and Press “Diophantus”,Department of Informatics
[4] Athens University of Economics and Business,undefined
来源
Theory of Computing Systems | 2016年 / 59卷
关键词
Auctions; Second price; Sponsored search; Keyword auctions;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets.
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页码:1 / 23
页数:22
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