Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities

被引:0
作者
Martial Foucault
Thierry Madies
Sonia Paty
机构
[1] University of Montreal,Political Science Department
[2] European University Institute,University of Fribourg (Switzerland)
[3] RSCAS,CREM
[4] CRESUF,undefined
[5] CNRS,undefined
[6] EQUIPPE-University of Lille 1,undefined
[7] INRA-CESAER,undefined
来源
Public Choice | 2008年 / 137卷
关键词
Spending interactions; France; Local government; Dynamic panel data; D72; H2; H7;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper aims at testing whether there exist spending interactions between French municipalities by estimating a dynamic panel data model. Our results suggest that there are some interactions between neighbouring municipalities as regards primary and investment expenditures. A positive relationship between municipalities’ wage bill and unemployment rates is likely to stress a rise of temporary employment in those municipalities that suffer from social troubles. Further, the estimation results show that these interdependences also exist between cities whose mayors have the same partisan affiliation. Finally, our results confirm the opportunistic behaviour of local governments, which increase all categories of public spending in pre-electoral periods
引用
收藏
页码:57 / 80
页数:23
相关论文
共 76 条
[1]  
Anselin L.(1996)Simple diagnostic tests for spatial dependence Regional Science and Urban Economics 26 77-104
[2]  
Bera A. K.(1991)Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equation Review of Economic Studies 58 277-297
[3]  
Florax R.(1995)Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models Journal of Econometrics 68 29-52
[4]  
Yoon M. J.(2005)The influence of local and national economic conditions on French legislative elections Public Choice 125 363-383
[5]  
Arellano M.(1995)Fiscal dynamics of local elected officials Public Choice 83 221-249
[6]  
Bond S. R.(1995)Incumbent behaviour: vote seeking, tax setting and yardstick competition American Economic Review 85 25-45
[7]  
Arellano M.(1995)Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits Quarterly Journal of Economics 150 769-798
[8]  
Bover O.(2003)Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States Journal of Economic Literature 41 7-73
[9]  
Auberger A.(2004)Tax degression and the political budget cycle in French municipalities Applied Economics Letters 11 905-908
[10]  
Dubois E.(1998)Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models Journal of Econometrics 87 115-143