Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test

被引：0

作者：

John Turri

机构：

[1] University of Waterloo,Philosophy Department

来源：

Synthese | 2015年 / 192卷

关键词：

Knowledge; Assertion; Norms; Social cognition ; Belief; Evidence; Experimental philosophy;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

An impressive case has been built for the hypothesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion, otherwise known as the knowledge account of assertion. According to the knowledge account, you should assert something only if you know that it’s true. A wealth of observational data supports the knowledge account, and some recent empirical results lend further, indirect support. But the knowledge account has not yet been tested directly. This paper fills that gap by reporting the results of such a test. The knowledge account passes with flying colors.

引用

页码：385 / 392

页数：7

共 9 条

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[8]

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