The unimportance of being any future person

被引：0
作者：
Johan E. Gustafsson
机构：
[1] University of York,Department of Philosophy
来源：
Philosophical Studies | 2018年 / 175卷
关键词：
Personal identity; Division; Fission; Indeterminacy; Survival; What matters;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Derek Parfit’s argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit’s argument so that it works against the platitude on the intended reading.
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页码：745 / 750
页数：5
相关论文
共 9 条
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