Axelrod Meets Cournot: Oligopoly and the Evolutionary Metaphor

被引：7
作者：
Dixon H.D. [1 ]
Wallis S. [2 ]
Moss S. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Economics Department, York University
[2] Centre for Policy Modelling, Faculty of Management and Business, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester M1 3GH, Aytoun Building, Aytoun Street
来源：
Computational Economics | 2002年 / 20卷 / 3期
关键词：
Cournot; duopoly; evolution;
D O I：
10.1023/A:1020922214711
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper explores the implication of evolutionary models (replicator dynamics) in a simple Cournot duopoly model. A firm type is a linear decision rule in which the firm's output depends on the other firm's previous output. First we run an Axelrod Tournament between firm types. The champion firm isa near profit-maximizer. Secondly, we allow social evolution to occur using replicator dynamics. Here we find that there are very strong forces leading towards a collusive or near collusive outcome, so long as there is not too much 'noise' in the dynamics. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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页码：139 / 156
页数：17
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