Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations

被引：0

作者：

Irlenbusch B. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, Houghton Street

来源：

Central European Journal of Operations Research | 2006年 / 14卷 / 1期

关键词：

Career Concern; Fixed Wage; Relative Performance Evaluation; Piece Rate; Gift Exchange;

D O I：

10.1007/s10100-006-0157-6

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Controllability is the decisive advantage of experimental research. Therefore this method suggests itself for investigating clear-cut hypothesis regarding the impact of managerial design issues on organisational behaviour. The current paper reviews selective experimental findings on behaviour under various incentives schemes. It is found that the effectiveness of fixed wages is to a large extent determined by social norms like reciprocity. Fixed wages are analysed if effort is intransparent and in the presence of career concerns. Furthermore they are contrasted with piece rate schemes. Different design options of relative compensation, are discussed with a special emphasis on taking sabotage activities into account. © Springer-Verlag 2006.

引用

页码：1 / 24

页数：23

共 76 条

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