Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies

被引：0

作者：

Nakamura S. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Faculty of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku

来源：

Review of Economic Design | 1998年 / 3卷 / 2期

关键词：

Implementation; Impossibility; Nash equilibrium; Two-agent; Walras equilibrium;

D O I：

10.1007/s100580050011

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In this note, we prove two impossibility results of Nash implementation in two-person economies. First, we will show the non-existence of continuous and balanced mechanisms which implement the Walrasian correspondence. Second, by adding a convexity assumption of mechanisms, we present the impossibility of continuous implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations in balanced way. © Springer-Verlag 1998.

引用

页码：159 / 165

页数：6

共 6 条

[1] Hurwicz, L., On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria (1979) J. Econ. Theory, 21, pp. 140-165
[2] Hurwicz, L., Balanced outcome functions yielding Walrasian and Lindahl allocations at Nash equilibrium points for two or more agents (1979) General Equilibrium, Growth, and Trade, , J. Green, J. Scheinkman (eds.) Academic Press, New York
[3] Hurwicz, L., Weinberger, H., (1984) On Smooth Balanced Nash Mechanisms Which Implement Pareto-optimal Performance Correspondence in Pure Exchanged Economies with Two Agents, , Mimeographed, University of Minnesota
[4] Kwan, Y., Nakamura, S., (1987) On Nash Implementation of the Walrasian or Lindahl Correspondence in the Two-agent Economy, , Center for Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 243, University of Minnesota
[5] Nakamura, S., A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy (1990) Econ. Lett., 34, pp. 5-9
[6] Reichelstein, S., Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms (1984) Econ. Lett., 16, pp. 239-242

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