Realism, positivism and reference

被引：0

作者：

Duran J. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Dept. of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara

来源：

Journal for General Philosophy of Science | 2005年 / 36卷 / 2期

关键词：

Instrumentalism; Logical empiricism; Positivism; Realism;

D O I：

10.1007/s10838-006-5625-0

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Depending on the realist or instrumentalist twist that is given to positivism, interesting arguments can be made for both causal and classical theories of reference with regard to the use of scientific terms in the language of theory. But my claim is that the rigid foundationalism that supports the theoretical terms via the correspondence rules of the Received View undercuts the notion that it is possible to argue coherently for a causal theory of reference as allied to a positivistic view. © Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006.

引用

页码：401 / 407

页数：6

共 12 条

[1] Lewis J., Schlick's critique of positivism, PSA 1988, 1, (1988)
[2] Lewis J., PSA 1988
[3] Suppe F., The Structure of Scientific Theories, (1977)
[4] Russell B., The philosophy of logical atomism, Russell on Truth and Logic, (1972)
[5] Coffa J.A., Carnap's sprachanschauung circa 1932, PSA 1976, (1977)
[6] Coffa J.A., PSA 1976
[7] Coffa J.A., PSA 1976
[8] Suppe, PSA 1976
[9] Quine W.V.O., The scope and language of science, The Ways of Paradox, (1966)
[10] Austin J.L., Sense and Sensibility, pp. 111-113, (1964)

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