Competition, Auctions & Negotiations in REIT Takeovers

被引:0
作者
J. Harold Mulherin
Kiplan S. Womack
机构
[1] University of Georgia,Department of Finance, Terry College of Business
[2] Pepperdine University,Department of Finance & Accounting, Graziadio School of Business & Management
来源
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics | 2015年 / 50卷
关键词
Real Estate Investment Trust; REITs; Mergers; Acquisitions; Competition; Auction; Negotiation; Takeovers; Information costs;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The lack of hostile takeovers and relatively modest wealth gains associated with REIT mergers motivate two fundamental yet previously unexplored questions: how competitive are REIT takeovers, and how exactly does a REIT sell itself to another firm? This paper examines these questions using hand-collected data from SEC merger filings. Four primary findings emerge from this study. First, REITs most often utilize a sales process resembling an auction, where an average of 19 potential buyers are contacted. Second, REIT mergers are on average just as competitive, or more so, as those in other industries. Third, the market for corporate control for REITs is more active than previously thought. Fourth, failure to account for publicly available signals that a REIT is for sale (which typically occur several months in advance prior to the official public merger announcement) results in omitting approximately one third of the total shareholder wealth effect produced by REIT mergers.
引用
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页码:151 / 180
页数:29
相关论文
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