Phenomenal properties are luminous properties

被引:0
|
作者
Geoffrey Hall
机构
[1] University of Notre Dame,
来源
Synthese | 2021年 / 199卷
关键词
Phenomenal properties; Reductive theories of consciousness; Epistemology of perception; Knowledge; Luminosity; Phenomenal intentionality; Higher order theories of consciousness; Epistemology; Philosophy of perception; Metaphysics;
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摘要
What is the connection between having a phenomenal property and knowing that one has that property? A traditional view on the matter takes the connection to be quite intimate. Whenever one has a phenomenal property, one knows that one does. Recently most authors have denied this traditional view. The goal of this paper is to defend the traditional view. In fact, I will defend something much stronger: I will argue that what it is for a property to be phenomenal is for it to be a (consistent) property one must know oneself to have when on has it. As we will see, this theory has a number of surprising and welcome upshots, suggesting that the traditional view has been unjustly maligned.
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页码:11001 / 11022
页数:21
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