Reflexive Games in the Linear Stackelberg Duopoly Models under Incoincident Reflexion Ranks

被引：0
作者：
M. I. Geraskin
机构：
[1] Samara National Research University,
来源：
Automation and Remote Control | 2020年 / 81卷
关键词：
oligopoly; Stackelberg leader; reflexive game; Nash equilibrium;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
An oligopoly market with a Stackelberg leader (leaders) and the reflexive behavior of market participants (agents) is considered; for this market, the problem of determining equilibria in the case of incoincident reflexion ranks and different marginal and constant costs of agents is studied. A reflexive game model for a duopoly market is developed and formulas for calculating informational equilibria under incoincident reflexion ranks and different marginal and constant costs of agents are obtained. As is demonstrated below, the advanced (lagged) reflexion of one agent compared to the counteragent affects the intensity of competition in the oligopoly market, making non-uniform the payoff distribution between the agents in favor of the reflexive leader.
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页码：302 / 319
页数：17
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