State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism

被引:0
作者
Josefa Toribio
机构
[1] The University of Edinburgh,Department of Philosophy
来源
Erkenntnis | 2008年 / 69卷
关键词
Perceptual Experience; Conceptual Content; Perceptual Justification; Perceptual Belief; Perceptual Content;
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学科分类号
摘要
It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported. Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all.
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页码:351 / 361
页数:10
相关论文
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