Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments

被引：0
作者：
Osana H. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Department of Economics, Keio University, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108
来源：
Review of Economic Design | 1997年 / 3卷 / 1期
关键词：
Feasible mechanism; Indecomposable environments; Nash implementation; Weak Pareto choice rule;
D O I：
10.1007/PL00013687
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
A feasible mechanism is constructed which weakly Nash-implements the weak Pareto choice rule over a certain class of indecomposable pure-exchange environments, where there may be no private goods whose consumption has no external effects. © Springer-Verlag 1997.
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页码：57 / 74
页数：17
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