Does the Accounting Profession Discipline Its Members Differently After Public Scrutiny?

This study examines how the accounting profession disciplines its members for professional misconduct in periods of increased public scrutiny. We conjecture and find that increased public scrutiny of the Canadian accounting profession, marked by the establishment of the Canadian Public Accountability Board in 2003, is positively associated with the severity of punitive sanctions administered by the profession's disciplinary committees. We find that disciplinary committees are more likely to also demand rehabilitation outcomes and greater future monitoring for offenders. Finally, reporting of discipline outcomes has increased in outlets internal to the accounting profession, but not in publications targeted outside to the public. This latter finding is consistent with the private interest theoretical model of professional ethics developed by Parker (Acc Organ Soc 19:507-525, 1994) as evidence of a latent motivation of the profession to protect its professional private interests. Exploratory analyses indicate that punishment, rehabilitation, and reporting in external publications significantly influence whether offenders return to good standing.