Belief, credence, and evidence

被引:0
作者
Elizabeth Jackson
机构
[1] University of Notre Dame,Dept of Philosophy
来源
Synthese | 2020年 / 197卷
关键词
Belief; Credence; Evidence; Rationality; Lottery paradox; Statistical evidence; Salience;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view focuses on the possibilities that the evidence makes salient. I argue that this makes better sense of the difference between rational credence and rational belief than other accounts.
引用
收藏
页码:5073 / 5092
页数:19
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