A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure

被引：0

作者：

Frank Huettner

机构：

[1] Université de Franche-Comté,

[2] CRESE (EA 3190),undefined

[3] LSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches Institut,undefined

[4] HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management,undefined

来源：

Theory and Decision | 2015年 / 78卷

关键词：

Shapley value; Owen value; Proportional value; Consistency;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We introduce a solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility and a coalition structure that is proportional for two-player games. Our value is obtained from generalizing a proportional value for cooperative games with transferable utility (Ortmann 2000) in a way that parallels the extension of the Shapley value to the Owen value. We provide two characterizations of our solution concept, one that employs a property that can be seen as the proportional analog to Myerson’s balanced contribution property; and a second one that relies on a consistency property.

引用

页码：273 / 287

页数：14

共 19 条

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