An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets

被引：0
作者：
Francesc Llerena
Marina Núñez
Carles Rafels
机构：
[1] Universitat Rovira i Virgili-CREIP,Dep. de Gestió d’Empreses
[2] Universitat de Barcelona,Dep. de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2015年 / 44卷
关键词：
Cooperative games; Assignment game; Core; Nucleolus;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents’ reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen’s reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in (Math Opr Res 4:303–338, 1979).
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页码：1 / 15
页数：14
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