Italian households’ debt: the participation to the debt market and the size of the loan

被引:0
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作者
Silvia Magri
机构
[1] Banca d’Italia,Research Department
来源
Empirical Economics | 2007年 / 33卷
关键词
Household debt; Enforcement costs of loan contracts; D12; D91; E21;
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摘要
This paper analyses Italian households’ participation to the debt market, separating the probability of demanding a loan from the probability of being rationed by lenders; on the supply side of the market specific attention is paid to enforcement costs of the loan contract when customers default. A new result is that the age of the household head acts essentially as a demand factor, rather than a variable influencing the lender’s choice. Both current and future households’ income increase the demand for loans and reduce credit rationing. Self-employed workers are more rationed by lenders. Credit constraints are also linked to the area where the household lives, partly because of different enforcement costs. The final part of the paper analyses the equilibrium quantity of the loan, for households who have a loan and are not constrained. The loan size is positively linked to household net wealth and income profile. An important contribution of this paper is the finding that, not only the participation to the debt market, but also the loan size is negatively affected by enforcement costs.
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页码:401 / 426
页数:25
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