The Effect of Overconfidence on the Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to Equity Risk

被引：0
作者：
Jijun Niu
机构：
[1] Simon Fraser University,Faculty of Business Administration
来源：
Journal of Financial Services Research | 2010年 / 38卷
关键词：
Overconfidence; CEO compensation; Risk taking; Bank;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Recent theory predicts that shareholders provide overconfident managers with weaker risk-taking incentives. We test this prediction using a sample of bank CEOs over the period 1993–2002. We classify a CEO as overconfident if he is more often characterized as confident than as cautious in press. Consistent with theory, we find that the sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk is lower for overconfident CEOs. Our finding suggests that shareholders know whether a CEO is overconfident, and take that into account when designing the compensation contract for the CEO.
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页码：23 / 39
页数：16
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