What are social groups? Their metaphysics and how to classify them

被引:0
作者
Brian Epstein
机构
[1] Tufts University,
来源
Synthese | 2019年 / 196卷
关键词
Social groups; Metaphysics; Ritchie; Group agency; Shared intention; Functionalism; Identity; Sociality; Norms; Committees; Organizations; Constitution; Anchoring;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper presents a systematic approach for analyzing and explaining the nature of social groups. I argue against prominent views that attempt to unify all social groups or to divide them into simple typologies. Instead I argue that social groups are enormously diverse, but show how we can investigate their natures nonetheless. I analyze social groups from a bottom-up perspective, constructing profiles of the metaphysical features of groups of specific kinds. We can characterize any given kind of social group with four complementary profiles: its “construction” profile, its “extra essentials” profile, its “anchor” profile, and its “accident” profile. Together these provide a framework for understanding the nature of groups, help classify and categorize groups, and shed light on group agency.
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页码:4899 / 4932
页数:33
相关论文
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