Enlargement and institutional reform in the European Union: Separate or connected issues?

被引：0

作者：

Steunenberg B. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Leiden University, Department of Public Administration, 2300 RB Leiden

来源：

Constitutional Political Economy | 2001年 / 12卷 / 4期

关键词：

Constitutional choice; EU enlargement; Game forms; Institutional reform;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1012533124779

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In this paper, I analyze how the enlargement process is connected to the currently proposed institutional reforms in the European Union. Although the 'official' claim is that enlargement requires reform, the relationship between both processes needs clarification. The use of unanimity voting for policy issues leads to substantial deadlock in the current Union, a problem that could be solved by the introduction of (qualified) majority voting. Moreover, in view of its current 'inflexibility' enlargement would only marginally decrease the Union's capacity to make decisions. Under qualified majority rule, enlargement is likely to have little or no effect on 'flexibility' given the distribution of preferences of the member-states. Also, if qualified majority voting is used, enlargement would decrease the power of the current member-states in a future Union, especially the larger ones. This, and the possibility for current member-states to link enlargement with specific policy demands, could be the crucial factors in the timing and shaping of the enlargement process. © 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：351 / 370

页数：19

共 48 条

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