Special Section on Central Bank Financial Independence and Policy Credibility: Introduction

被引：0

|

作者：

Peter Stella

机构：

来源：

IMF Staff Papers | 2005年 / 52卷 / 2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/30035899

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：287 / 288

页数：1

相关论文

共 50 条

[1] Special section on central bank financial independence and policy credibility: Introduction
Stella, P
IMF STAFF PAPERS, 2005, 52 (02): : 287 - 288
[2] Central Bank Credibility, Independence, and Monetary Policy
Aguir, Abdelkader
JOURNAL OF CENTRAL BANKING THEORY AND PRACTICE, 2018, 7 (03) : 91 - 110
[3] Central bank financial strength, transparency, and policy credibility
Stella, P
IMF STAFF PAPERS, 2005, 52 (02): : 335 - 365
[4] Central Bank Financial Strength, Transparency, and Policy Credibility
Peter Stella
IMF Staff Papers, 2005, 52 (2): : 335 - 365
[5] Institutions and monetary policy: Credibility, flexibility and central bank independence
Stemp, P
ECONOMIC RECORD, 1997, 73 (222) : 300 - 301
[6] Institutions and monetary policy: Credibility, flexibility, and central bank independence
McDermott, J
PUBLIC CHOICE, 1998, 94 (3-4) : 429 - 433
[7] Eric Schaling, Institutions and monetary policy: Credibility, flexibility, and central bank independence
John McDermott
Public Choice, 1998, 94 : 429 - 433
[8] The limits of delegation: Veto players, Central Bank independence, and the credibility of monetary policy
Keefer, P
Stasavage, D
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 2003, 97 (03) : 407 - 423
[9] Institutions and monetary policy: Credibility, flexibility and central bank independence - Schaling,E
Davis, EP
MANCHESTER SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STUDIES, 1996, 64 (03): : 340 - 341
[10] CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY AND INDEPENDENCE - CUKIERMAN,A
BUCKLE, B
ECONOMIC RECORD, 1993, 69 (207) : 465 - 468

← 1 2 3 4 5 →