Did the legalization of abortion increase women's household bargaining power? Evidence from labor supply

被引：0
作者：
Oreffice S. [1 ]
机构：
[1] The John E. Walker Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634
来源：
Review of Economics of the Household | 2007年 / 5卷 / 2期
关键词：
Household bargaining power; Labor supply; Legalization of abortion;
D O I：
10.1007/s11150-007-9009-y
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
I estimate the impact of abortion legalization on spouses' labor supplies to test whether legalization increased women's household bargaining power, in a collective household behavior framework. Based on CPS data, I find that wives' labor supply decreased and their husbands' increased, which is consistent with the bargaining hypothesis. This contrasts with most studies of abortion and birth control technologies, which predict a labor supply effect only for women, and of opposite sign. Also consistent with the bargaining interpretation, I estimate no significant impact on anti-abortion religious couples or on those who regularly used contraceptives. PSID data yield supportive evidence. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007.
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页码：181 / 207
页数：26
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