United Shoe Machinery and the antitrust significance of 'free' service

被引：0

作者：

Blair R.D. ^{[1
]}

Herndon J.B. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] University of Florida, Department of Economics, Gainesville

来源：

Review of Industrial Organization | 2000年 / 17卷 / 3期

关键词：

Antitrust; Durable goods; Leasing practices;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1007883408418

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., United Shoe Machinery was found guilty of illegal monopolization due to its leasing practices. Existing scholarship on this case largely focuses on the issue of leasing versus selling. In contrast, we examine a particular practice of United's that was condemned: its policy of providing service for its leased machines without a separate service charge. Our analysis demonstrates that this practice served an important insurance function by shifting risk from the shoe manufacturers to United, a more efficient bearer of risk, and concludes that this practice was efficiency enhancing.

引用

页码：301 / 311

页数：10

共 11 条

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