The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games

被引：0

作者：

Vincent C. H. Chua

H. C. Huang

机构：

[1] School of Economics and Social Sciences,

[2] Singapore Management University,undefined

[3] 469 Bukit Timah Road,undefined

[4] Singapore 259756,undefined

[5] Singapore (e-mail: vincentchua@smu.edu.sg),undefined

[6] Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering,undefined

[7] National University of Singapore,undefined

[8] Kent Ridge Crescent,undefined

[9] Singapore 119260,undefined

[10] Singapore,undefined

来源：

Social Choice and Welfare | 2003年 / 20卷

关键词：

Vote Power; Binary Game; Donation Paradox;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In this paper, we show that although the Shapley-Shubik index is immune to the donation paradox in weighted binary games, extension of the index to ternary games along the direction suggested in Felsenthal and Machover (1996, 1997) will cause it to be vulnerable to the paradox and this is the case as long as the number of players in the game exceeds three. This undermines the attractiveness of the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of a priori voting power.

引用

页码：387 / 403

页数：16

共 47 条

[1] The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games
Chua, VCH
Huang, HC
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2003, 20 (03) : 387 - 403
[2] The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
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[6] An asymmetric Shapley-Shubik power index
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GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2017, 105 : 148 - 154

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