Semantics and truth relative to a world

被引：0

作者：

Michael Glanzberg

机构：

[1] University of California – Davis,Department of Philosophy

来源：

Synthese | 2009年 / 166卷

关键词：

Semantics; Semantic value; Intensional logic; Content; Possible worlds; Relativism;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation for relativism based on the relativity of truth to a world fails.

引用

页码：281 / 307

页数：26

共 19 条

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