The effect of complementary private health insurance on the use of health care services

被引:0
作者
Astrid Kiil
Jacob Nielsen Arendt
机构
[1] KORA,
[2] the Danish Institute for Local and Regional Government Research,undefined
来源
International Journal of Health Economics and Management | 2017年 / 17卷
关键词
Private health insurance; Moral hazard; Health care utilization; Treatment effects; Parametric estimators; Propensity score matching; C31; I13;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This study estimates the effect of complementary private health insurance (PHI) on the use of health care. The empirical analysis focuses on an institutional setting in which empirical findings are still limited; namely on PHI covering co-payment for treatments that are only partly financed by a universal health care system. The analysis is based on Danish data recently collected specifically for this purpose, which makes identification strategies assuming selection on observables only, and on both observables and unobservables also, both plausible and possible. We find evidence of a substantial positive and significant effect of complementary PHI on the use of prescription medicine and chiropractic care, a smaller but significant effect on dental care, weaker indications of effects for physiotherapy and general practice, and finally that the use of hospital-based outpatient care is largely unaffected. This implies that complementary PHI is generally not simply a marker of a higher propensity to use health care but induces additional use of some health care services over and above what would be used in the absence of such coverage.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 27
页数:26
相关论文
共 95 条
  • [1] Abadie A(2008)On the failure of the bootstrap for matching estimators Econometrica 76 1537-1557
  • [2] Imbens GW(2012)The effect of health insurance coverage on the use of medical services American Economic Journal 4 1-27
  • [3] Anderson M(1996)Identification of the causal effects using instrumental variables Journal of the American Statistical Association 91 444-455
  • [4] Dobkin C(1963)Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care American Economic Review 53 941-973
  • [5] Gross T(2008)Moral hazard and the demand for health services: A matching estimator approach Journal of Health Economics 27 1006-1025
  • [6] Angrist JD(2012)A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care European Economic Review 56 669-690
  • [7] Imbens GW(2004)Access to physician services: Does supplemental insurance matter? Evidence from France Health Economics 13 669-687
  • [8] Rubin DB(1988)A microeconometric model of the demand for health care and health insurance in Australia Review of Economic Studies 1 85-106
  • [9] Arrow KJ(2008)The impact of nearly universal coverage on health care utilization: Evidence from Medicare American Economic Review 98 2242-2258
  • [10] Barros PP(1998)Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment European Economic Review 42 499-511