Modeling Human Decision-Making: An Overview of the Brussels Quantum Approach

被引:0
作者
Diederik Aerts
Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi
Sandro Sozzo
Tomas Veloz
机构
[1] Brussels Free University,Department of Mathematics, Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies
[2] Brussels Free University,Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies
[3] Laboratorio di Autoricerca di Base,School of Business and Centre IQSCS
[4] University of Leicester,Departamento Ciencias Biológicas, Facultad Ciencias de la Vida
[5] Universidad Andres Bello,undefined
[6] Instituto de Filosofía y Ciencias de la Complejidad,undefined
来源
Foundations of Science | 2021年 / 26卷
关键词
Quantum structures; Cognition; Concept theory; Decision theory; Human reasoning;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We present the fundamentals of the quantum theoretical approach we have developed in the last decade to model cognitive phenomena that resisted modeling by means of classical logical and probabilistic structures, like Boolean, Kolmogorovian and, more generally, set theoretical structures. We firstly sketch the operational-realistic foundations of conceptual entities, i.e. concepts, conceptual combinations, propositions, decision-making entities, etc. Then, we briefly illustrate the application of the quantum formalism in Hilbert space to represent combinations of natural concepts, discussing its success in modeling a wide range of empirical data on concepts and their conjunction, disjunction and negation. Next, we naturally extend the quantum theoretical approach to model some long-standing ‘fallacies of human reasoning’, namely, the ‘conjunction fallacy’ and the ‘disjunction effect’. Finally, we put forward an explanatory hypothesis according to which human reasoning is a defined superposition of ‘emergent reasoning’ and ‘logical reasoning’, where the former generally prevails over the latter. The quantum theoretical approach explains human fallacies as the consequence of genuine quantum structures in human reasoning, i.e. ‘contextuality’, ‘emergence’, ‘entanglement’, ‘interference’ and ‘superposition’. As such, it is alternative to the Kahneman–Tversky research programme, which instead aims to explain human fallacies in terms of ‘individual heuristics and biases’.
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页码:27 / 54
页数:27
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