The Impact of Ownership Concentration, Commissioners on Bank Risk and Profitability: Evidence from Indonesia

被引：16

作者：

Hanafi M.M. ^{[1
]}

Santi F. ^{[2
]}

Muazaroh ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Management, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Yogyakarta

[2] Department of Management, Faculty of Economics, University of Bengkulu, Bengkulu

[3] Department of Management, Faculty of Economics, STIE Perbanas Surabaya

来源：

Eurasian Economic Review | 2013年 / 3卷 / 2期

关键词：

Bank Risk; Commissioners; Corporate Governance; Indonesia; Ownership Concentration;

D O I：

10.14208/eer.2013.03.02.005

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We investigate corporate governance and risk in Indonesian banking. More specifically, we investigate whether ownership concentration and commissioners affect bank risk and profitability. Using a sample of 117 Indonesian banks (for ownership concentration analysis), and 28 public banks (for commissioner analysis), we find that ownership concentration and governance by larger numbers of commissioners improves a bank’s profitability and it’s handling of risk. The impact of commissioners on bank risk and profitability takes non-linear forms. We also show that various types of commissioners have different impacts on bank risk and profitability. Our study highlights the importance of corporate governance in the banking industry. © 2013, Eurasia Business and Economics Society.

引用

页码：183 / 202

页数：19

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