Complete games with minimum

被引：0
作者：
J. Freixas
M.A. Puente
机构：
来源：
Annals of Operations Research | 1998年 / 84卷
关键词：
Cooperative Game; Characteristic Invariant; Simple Game; Winning Coalition; Veto Player;
D O I：
暂无
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学科分类号：
摘要：
Some real-world examples of simple games, like the procedure to amend the Canadian Constitution, are complete simple games with minimum. Using characteristic invariants for this class of games, we study different types of solution concepts. For an arbitrary number of players we get the nucleolus by means of a determinate compatible system of equations, characterize the maximality of the kernel and give a method to calculate semivalues. Several applications are found at the end of the paper.
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页码：97 / 109
页数：12
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