Dissertation abstract: Essays on veto bargaining games

被引：0
|
作者：
Hankyoung Sung
机构：
[1] Korea Institute for International Economic Policy,
来源：
Experimental Economics | 2007年 / 10卷
关键词：
Veto power; Bargaining; Committees;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This dissertation experimentally analyzes the outcomes of multilateral legislative bargaining games in the presence of a veto player.
引用
收藏
页码：195 / 196
页数：1
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