Centering on Demonstrative Thought

被引：0
作者：
Christopher Buford
机构：
[1] University of Akron,Department of Philosophy
来源：
Philosophia | 2013年 / 41卷
关键词：
Memory; Demonstrative-thought; Campbell; Deep centering;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The nature of perceptual demonstratives, the ‘that F’ component of judgments of the form ‘that F is G’ based on perceptual input, has been a topic of interest for many philosophers. Another related, though distinct, question concerns the nature of demonstrative judgments based not on current perceptual input, but instead derived from memory. I argue that the account put forward by John Campbell fails to adequately account for memory-based demonstrative thought.
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页码：1135 / 1147
页数：12
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