Fitch's paradox and probabilistic antirealism

被引：7
作者：
Douven I. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven
来源：
Studia Logica | 2007年 / 86卷 / 2期
关键词：
Antirealism; Bayesian epistemology; Fitch's paradox; Truth;
D O I：
10.1007/s11225-007-9058-5
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Fitch's paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch's result while still offering all that antirealists should care for. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
引用
收藏
页码：149 / 182
页数：33
相关论文
共 82 条
[1]  
ACHINSTEIN P., The Book of Evidence, (2001)
[2]  
ADLER J., Belief's Own Ethics, (2002)
[3]  
ALBERT D., Quantum Mechanics and Experience, (1992)
[4]  
BEALL J.C., Fitch's Proof, Verificationism and the Knower Paradox, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, pp. 241-247, (2000)
[5]  
BIRD A., Philosophy of Science, (1998)
[6]  
BROGAARD B., SALERNO J., Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant, Analysis, 62, pp. 143-150, (2002)
[7]  
DEROSE K., Assertion, Knowledge, and Context, Philosophical Review, 111, pp. 167-203, (2002)
[8]  
DEVITT M., Dummett's Anti-Realism, Journal of Philosophy, 80, pp. 73-99, (1983)
[9]  
DORLING J., Bayesian Personalism, the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, and Duhem's Problem, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 10, pp. 177-187, (1979)
[10]  
DOUVEN I., Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent, Philosophy of Science, 66, (1999)
123456789