Market share delegation and strategic trade policy

被引:22
作者
Wang L.F.S. [1 ]
Wang Y.-C. [2 ]
Zhao L. [3 ]
机构
[1] Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung
[2] Department of Finance and Banking, Kun Shan University
[3] Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi'an Jiaotong University
关键词
Asymmetric cost; Export subsidy; Import tariff; Market share delegation; Sales delegation;
D O I
10.1007/s10842-007-0027-5
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Strategic delegation analysis has been limited to sales delegation cases, until Jansen et al. (International Journal of Industrial Organization 25:531 - 539, 2007) presented the case of market share delegation. In international trade theory, export rivalry and import protection have always attracted considerable attention. This paper assesses the influence upon optimal trade policy of introducing market share delegation in a trade duopoly context. It shows that delegation matters, and different forms of delegation coupled with asymmetric costs will imply different degrees of government intervention. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007.
引用
收藏
页码:49 / 56
页数:7
相关论文
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