Auctions with shill bidding

被引:0
作者
Indranil Chakraborty
Georgia Kosmopoulou
机构
[1] University of Oklahoma,Department of Economics
来源
Economic Theory | 2004年 / 24卷
关键词
Auction; Shill bidding; Seller participation;
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摘要
Shill bidding has increased substantially in recent years since the technology employed to conduct on-line auctions enables many sellers to disguise their identities and bid. Although their intent is to gain by misleading the bidders on the value of the object, we show that in a common value auction sellers are worse off shill bidding. In fact, any out-of-auction mechanism that makes it difficult for them to shill bid increases their revenues. In addition, shill bidding reduces the surplus of the bidders and the surplus from trade. It is only the auctioneer who could gain from this activity and in that sense he may not have an incentive from within the auction to discourage shill bidding.
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页码:271 / 287
页数:16
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