Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?

被引:0
作者
Axel Dreher
Jan-Egbert Sturm
机构
[1] University of Goettingen,
[2] KOF Swiss Economic Institute,undefined
[3] ETH Zurich,undefined
[4] IZA,undefined
[5] CESifo,undefined
来源
Public Choice | 2012年 / 151卷
关键词
IMF; World Bank; UN General Assembly; Voting; Aid; F33;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Using panel data for 188 countries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the United States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
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页码:363 / 397
页数:34
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