Does add-on presence always lead to lower baseline prices? Theory and evidence

被引:0
作者
Marco Savioli
Lorenzo Zirulia
机构
[1] University of Salento,Department of Economics
[2] RCEA,Department of Economics
[3] University of Bologna,ICRIOS
[4] Bocconi University,undefined
来源
Journal of Economics | 2020年 / 129卷
关键词
Add-ons; Pricing; Cruise industry; Hedonic regression; D43; L83;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In many industries, firms give consumers the opportunity to add (at a price) optional goods and services to a baseline product. The aim of our paper is to clarify the effect that offering add-ons has on baseline prices. In order to do that, we develop a theoretical model of add-on pricing in competitive environments with two distinctive features. First, we discuss the choice of offering the add-on, if this entails a fixed cost. Second, we allow firms to have a varying degree of market power over the add-on. In symmetric equilibria, the presence of add-on always reduces baseline prices. In asymmetric equilibria in which only one firm offers the add-on, its presence increases the baseline price if the firm’s market power over the add-on is limited. The latter prediction of the model is confirmed by a hedonic price regression using a dataset of cruises offered worldwide, a situation in which it is possible to control for the level of add-on market power.
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页码:143 / 172
页数:29
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