Lobbying, corruption and "optimal" tariff

被引：0

作者：

Chen S.-S. ^{[1
]}

Hsu C.-C. ^{[2
]}

Huang C.-S. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Department of International Business and Trade, Shu-Te University, Kaohsiung

[2] Department of Marketing and Logistics Management, YuDa University, 168, Hsueh-fu Rd., Chao-chiao, Miao-li

[3] Department of International Business, YuDa University, Chao-chiao, Miao-li

来源：

International Review of Economics | 2013年 / 60卷 / 4期

关键词：

Corruption; Lobbying; Tariff;

D O I：

10.1007/s12232-012-0164-y

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper explores how a government officer enacts "optimum" import policy when confronting lobbies on trade policies from both domestic and foreign firms in a transition economy. Two results are found: firstly, if the inducement from the foreign firm on the government officer works, then the optimum tariff is negative, that is, import subsidy. However, this subsidy will turn to a positive tariff rate with the increasing lobbying inducement from domestic firms. Secondly, zero tariff duty is not an optimum choice under most circumstances. Besides, an asymmetric result is that when these two firms' marginal costs are different, the optimum policy is to levy an import tariff on the one whose marginal cost is relatively small, while the other firm will get an import subsidy. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

引用

页码：375 / 386

页数：11

共 17 条

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