Ontological-Transcendental Defence of Metanormative Realism

被引:0
作者
Michael Kowalik
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来源
Philosophia | 2020年 / 48卷
关键词
Metanormative realism; Normativity; Metaethics; Agency; Social ontology;
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摘要
If there is something (P) that every possible agent is committed to value above all else, and certain actions or attitudes either enhance or diminish P, then normative claims about a range of intentional actions can be objectively and non-trivially evaluated. I argue that the degree of existence as an agent depends on the consistency of reflexive-relating with other individuals of the agent-kind: the ontological thesis. I then show that in intending to act on a reason, every agent is rationally committed to value above all else being an agent, what consists in exercising the capacity to act and having the freedom to discriminate between more or less valuable actions: the transcendental thesis. Since the degree of possession of this personal but non-contingent good depends on relating to other agents in a special way, certain actions and attitudes may be objectively right or wrong for all agents.
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页码:573 / 586
页数:13
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