Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games

被引：0

作者：

Francis Bloch

Matthew O. Jackson

机构：

[1] Université d’Aix-Marseille,GREQAM

[2] Stanford University,Department of Economics

来源：

International Journal of Game Theory | 2006年 / 34卷

关键词：

Networks; Network games; Game theory; Equilibrium; Side payments; Transfers; Bargaining; D85; C71; C72; L14; Z13;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium definitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of definitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are possible.

引用

页码：305 / 318

页数：13

共 18 条

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