A Dilemma for Privacy as Control

被引:0
作者
Björn Lundgren
机构
[1] Institute for Futures Studies,Department of Philosophy
[2] Stockholm University,Department of Philosophy
[3] University of Twente,undefined
来源
The Journal of Ethics | 2020年 / 24卷
关键词
Privacy; Control; Limited access;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Although popular, control accounts of privacy suffer from various counterexamples. In this article, it is argued that two such counterexamples—while individually resolvable—can be combined to yield a dilemma for control accounts of privacy. Furthermore, it is argued that it is implausible that control accounts of privacy can defend against this dilemma. Thus, it is concluded that we ought not define privacy in terms of control. Lastly, it is argued that since the concept of privacy is the object of the right to privacy if the former cannot be defined in terms of control, neither can the latter.
引用
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页码:165 / 175
页数:10
相关论文
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