Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

被引：0

作者：

Juan I. Block

David K. Levine

机构：

[1] University of Cambridge,Faculty of Economics

[2] European University Institute,Department of Economics

[3] Washington University in St. Louis,Department of Economics

来源：

International Journal of Game Theory | 2016年 / 45卷

关键词：

Repeated game; Folk theorem; Self-referential game ; Approximate equilibrium; D01; D03; D82;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent’s intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents’ play: direct observation of the opponent’s intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent’s play in a repeated setting.

引用

页码：971 / 984

页数：13

共 34 条

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