Making moral principles suit yourself

被引:0
作者
Matthew L. Stanley
Paul Henne
Laura Niemi
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Felipe De Brigard
机构
[1] Duke University,Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience
[2] Department of Philosophy,Department of Psychology, College of Arts and Sciences; Management and Organizations, Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell SC Johnson College of Business
[3] Neuroscience Program,Department of Philosophy, Kenan Institute for Ethics, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, Law School
[4] Lake Forest College,Department of Philosophy, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke Institute for Brain Sciences
[5] Cornell University,undefined
[6] Duke University,undefined
[7] Duke University,undefined
来源
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | 2021年 / 28卷
关键词
Morality; Principles; Memory; Autobiographical; Identity;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer general moral principles for people to follow. These moral principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid, offering reliable guides for moral judgment and decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found consistent evidence that agreement with general moral principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with those very principles—relative to participants who recalled events in which other people violated the principles. This shift in agreement was explained, in part, by people’s willingness to excuse their own moral transgressions, but not the transgressions of others. These results have important implications for understanding the roles memory and personal identity in moral judgment. People’s commitment to moral principles may be maintained when they recall others’ past violations, but their commitment may wane when they recall their own violations.
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页码:1735 / 1741
页数:6
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